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The Arkansas Supreme Court v. 
Landmen Title Examiners: 
Recent Oil & Gas Decisions
J. H. Evans, Attorney at Law 
P. 0 . Box 1872
Fort Smith, Arkansas 72902
The Arkansas Supreme Court vs. Landmen and Title Attorneys
I. INTRODUCTION:
A. The increased drilling activity of the past ten or 
fifteen years has resulted in increased litigation over 
mineral ownership.
B. Rules which establish mineral ownership with reasonable 
certainty a desirable goal.
C. A look at some Arkansas Supreme Court decisions 
concerning mineral ownership. ("Minerals" as used in 
this discussion includes oil and gas).
1. A brief look at the Strockhacker cases creating 
uncertainty as to whether the word "mineral" 
includes oil and gas.
2. A discussion of more recent decisions, some of 
which create uncertainties of mineral ownership 
for landmen and title attorneys.
3. All oil and gas title attorneys I know are 
extremely unhappy with some of these recent 
decisions, and believe the Arkansas Supreme Court 
has made some bad precedents.
D. Most mineral ownership title problems arise from 
severed mineral interests.
1. Adverse possession of the surface constitutes
adverse possession of the unsevered minerals, but 
not as to severed mineral interests.
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2. Title to severed minerals can only be acquired by 
adverse possession through continuous production 
and removal of the minerals for the statutory 
period of seven years.
II. A LOOK AT THE STROHACKER CASES:
A. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Strohacker. 202 
Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941). In 1892 and 1893 the 
Railroad, being the fee simple owner of certain land in 
Miller County, Arkansas, executed and delivered deeds 
thereto reserving "all coal and mineral deposits". 
Strohacker owned these lands except for whatever 
interest had been reserved by the Railroad. Strohacker 
filed suit in the Miller County Chancery Court against 
the Railroad to quiet title in him to the oil and gas. 
His claim was that the parties to the deeds did not 
intend to include oil and gas by reserving "all coal 
and mineral deposits". The Trial Court held for 
Strohacker and the Railroad appealed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court 
decision, stating that the question to be answered was 
what the Railroad meant when it reserved "all coal and 
mineral deposits". The Court went on to say, in 
essence, that in 1892 and 1893 in Miller County oil and 
gas were not commonly recognized as minerals, and 
therefore the Railroad could not have intended to 
reserve same.
B. Stegall v. Bugh . 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1958).
On November 6, 1900, B. H. Stegall, the then owner of 
the fee simple title to 120 acres in Union County, 
Arkansas, executed a warranty deed to this land to M.
F. Goodwin which stated "except the mineral interest in 
said lands". The appellant, J. H. Stegall was the 
owner of all rights reserved by B. H. Stegall, and the 
appellee, Mrs. E. E. Bugh, was the owner of all 
interest not owned by J. H. Stegall. The trial judge 
held that the words "mineral interest" did not include 
oil and gas and entered an order quieting title to the 
oil and gas in Mrs. E. E. Bugh. Stegall appealed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that although there 
was testimony that B. H. Stegall intended to reserve 
the oil and gas, and he thought the words "mineral 
interest" included oil and gas, that his intention was 
not the controlling factor. In this connection the 
Court stated:
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"We think that the meaning which this court has 
heretofore and should hereafer give to the word 
'mineral' in connection with its use in situations 
similar to those of this case, is governed not by 
what the grantor meant or might have meant, but by 
the general legal or commercial usage of the word 
at the time and place of its usage. The testimony 
in the case under consideration justified the 
trial court, we think, in finding that the word 
'mineral', in its accepted legal and commercial 
usage, did not include oil and gas in Union County 
in 1900. This testimony was to the effect that 
there was no oil production in Union County until 
about 20 years after the deed in question was 
executed and that the word 'minerals', as commonly 
used in South Arkansas and Union County in 1900 
would not have included oil and gas."
Based on the foregoing the Arkansas Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's decision.
C. Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Company. 240 Ark. 691, 401 
S.W.2d 565 (1966). On July 26, 1905, George Heim, 
being the owner of the fee simple title, executed and 
delivered a deed to Arkansas Anthracite Coal Company 
conveying "all of the coal, oil and mineral" to certain 
land in Logan County, Arkansas. Ahne was the successor 
to the fee title of George Heim subject to the rights 
conveyed by the mineral deed to Arkansas Anthracite 
Coal Company, and the Reinhart & Donovan Company was 
the successor in title to the rights conveyed by the 
Heim deed.
The trial court held that the facts showed that gas was 
a commonly recognized mineral in Logan County in 1905, 
and that Reinhart and Donovan Company was therefore the 
owner of all gas under the land involved. Ahne 
appealed. In its opinion the Arkansas Supreme Court 
reviewed some of the pertinent facts from the evidence 
introduced during the trial, which are summarized as 
follows:
1. A gas field called the Mansfield Field was 
discovered in Scott and Sebastian Counties in 
1902.
2. Most professional landmen in the Arkansas Valley 
of Northern Arkansas agreed that the word 
"mineral" included gas after 1900.
3
3. In Logan County in 1901 Choctaw Oil Company 
obtained oil and gas leases on a sizable block of 
acreage and drilled wells pursuant to these 
leases.
4. 1900 was the earliest year in which there was 
evidence of the growing realization of petroleum 
as an economic mineral along the Arkansas River.
5. As early as 1901 oil and gas were commonly 
recognized minerals in Logan County.
Based upon the foregoing the Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's decision.
D. Uncertainty created by these decisions.
1. They were based upon factual issues on a county by 
county basis. For example, how early were oil and 
gas commonly recognized as minerals in other 
counties, such as Franklin, Johnson and Pope?
2. Justice McFaddin dissented from the majority 
opinions in the Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Company 
case. He agreed that oil and gas were generally 
recognized as minerals in 1905 and concurred with 
the majority in affirming the trial court's 
decision. His dissent was based upon the 
reasoning of the other Justices because they were 
proceeding on a county by county basis. He 
advocated making the decision uniform for the 
entire State so that all uncertainty would be 
erased, and stated he was convinced that oil and 
gas were commonly recognized as minerals in the 
entire State as early as January 1, 1900. He went 
on to say that "I wish this Court would so state
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and put an end to this 'drifting like a ship 
without a rudder' course that we are pursuing on 
this question which is vital to property".
3. In recent years the Trial judges in counties along 
the Arkansas River Valley, upon sufficient proof 
being made, seem to have more or less adopted 
Justice McFaddin's view, and have held oil and gas 
were minerals as early as 1903.
III. THE DUHIG RULE:
A. Its name is derived from the Texas Supreme Court case 
of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Company. 135 Tex. 503, 
144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). Duhig owned the surface and 
one-half of the minerals and executed a warranty deed 
to the predecessor in interest of Peavy-Moore. The 
deed warranted title to the described land but stated 
"it is expressly agreed and stipulated that the grantor 
herein retains an undivided one-half interest in and to 
all mineral rights or minerals of whatever description 
in the land." Duhig and Peavy-Moore each claimed 
ownership of the one-half mineral interest.
The majority opinion of the Texas Supreme Court held 
that the 1/2 interest was owned by Peavy-Moore. Their 
reasoning was based on a two step approach. First the 
granting clause operates and Peavy-Moore receives the 
surface and one-half of the minerals. Next, the 
reservation operates to return the one-half interest to 
Duhig, leaving Peavy-Moore with the surface only. At 
this point both the grant and the reservation have been 
given effect, but this leaves Duhig in breach of his 
warranty of conveying a 1/2 mineral interest. To cure 
the breach of warranty the 1/2 mineral interest is 
transferred from Duhig to Peavy-Moore.
B. The Duhig rule was not applied in Opaline King Hill v. 
Gilliam. 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985). In 1947 
S. E. Gilliam owned the surface and 1/2 interest in the 
minerals to certain land, and he executed a quitclaim 
deed to same to Jefferson Phillips, but Gilliam 
reserved a 1/2 interest in the oil, gas and minerals. 
The heirs of Gilliam and the heirs of Phillips each 
claimed this 1/2 mineral interest. The trial court 
held the 1/2 interest was reserved by Gilliam in the 
quitclaim deed and was owned by the Gilliam heirs.
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Upon appeal the Phillips heirs argued that applying the 
rule in the Duhig case should result in the interest 
being awarded to them. However, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court rejected this argument and affirmed the trial 
court's decision. The Court stated that Gilliam 
warranted nothing by his quitclaim deed and that the 
Duhig case did not apply. Thus, the reservation was 
effective to reserve the 1/2 mineral interest owned by 
Gilliam.
C. A few months after the Hill v. Gilliam decision the
Arkansas Supreme Court decided the case of Peterson v. 
Simpson. 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985). In 1948 
Pope owned the surface and 1/2 minerals to certain land 
and conveyed by warranty deed to Andrews, but Pope 
reserved 1/2 of the minerals. Andrews conveyed all his 
interest to Price, who conveyed to Brown, who conveyed 
to Neal, who conveyed to Pearson, who conveyed to the 
Simpsons. The Petersons are the successors in interest 
to Pope and claimed this 1/2 mineral interest, and they 
brought suit against the Simpsons to quiet title to 
this 1/2 mineral interest. The trial court held this 
1/2 mineral interest was owned by the Simpsons and the 
Petersons appealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
affirmed.
The Supreme Court discussed the Duhig case at some 
length and stated that it is to be applied to cases 
which do not involve the original grantor and his 
immediate grantee. In this connection the Court 
stated:
"As set forth previously in describing the chain 
of title, the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, 
Pope, did not convey directly to the defendants.
In fact, there were four intervening conveyances 
between the Pope deed and the Simpson deed. To 
decide the issue now on the basis of what Pope 
subjectively thought, or intended, when he 
conveyed to Andrews in 1948, when neither the 
grantees, nor their title examiners, were privy to 
that thought, would be greatly unfair. Therefore, 
the proper procedure to follow in cases which do 
not involve the original grantor and his immediate 
grantee, as here, is to arrive at the meaning of 
the deed according to rules of objective con-
struction, which we now hold to include 
application of the Duhig rule. Subjective 
considerations are not appropriate in such cases. 
Accordingly, with respect to such reservations 
contained in warranty deeds, a subsequent grantee 
is to receive that percentage of mineral interest 
in the land not reserved to the grantor, since the 
deed purports to deal with 100% of the minerals.
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If both the grant and the reservation cannot 
thereby be given effect, the reservation must fail 
and the risk of title loss is on the grantor."
"Subsequent purchasers, or grantees, must be able 
to rely upon this interpretation or else, under 
these type of circumstances, every title would 
require a lawsuit in order to be alienable. 
Rejection of the Duhig rule would mean sacrificing 
the degree of certainty and guidance that it can 
provide concerning marketability of mineral 
interests, and replacing it with an outbreak of 
lawsuits. This we are not willing to do."
"Our decision in this case does not change the 
general rule that subjective considerations may be 
taken into account in reformation cases involving 
the original grantor and his immediate grantee."
D. Three Justices dissented in the Peterson v. Simpson 
case. They stated the reservation should be given 
effect since subsequent grantees had constructive 
notice that the grantor only owned a 1/2 mineral 
interest.
IV. EFFECT OF UNRECORDED MINERAL DEED ON TITLE OF SUBSEQUENT
OWNERS:
A. Bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
B. Title acquired by adverse possession and the subsequent 
grantees in the chain of title.
1. Taylor v. Scott, 285 Ark. 102, 685 S.W.2d 160
(1985) held that a deed effectively severed 1/2 of 
the minerals when executed even though not 
recorded for 18 years, during which time an 
adverse possessor and his subsequent grantees in 
the chain of title were in possession under a 
claim of ownership.
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2. The author of this opinion refuted the argument
that the decision would create uncertainty in the
oil and gas industry by stating:
"When a lawyer examines an abstract of title 
and finds that the apparent owner's title 
rests only on adverse possession, a rare 
situation [emphasis supplied], he is at once 
on notice that there may be flaws in the 
title, such as the interest of a minor or 
insane heir of a deceased holder of the 
record title."
3. As a matter of fact the rare situation is when 
there is a perfect record title. Thus, contrary 
to the author's statement, adverse possession is 
relied upon for title almost 100% of the time.
4. This decision makes it impossible to cure this 
defect with any certainty.
5. In Phelps v. Justiss Oil Company. 291 Ark. 538,
726 S.W.2d 662 (1987), the Court held that one who 
purchases from a grantor who does not have 
apparently a perfect record title is not a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice, and cited 
the Taylor v. Scott case in support thereof.
V. SHOULD THE LACHES OR ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES BE APPLIED TO 
PERSONS WHO FAIL TO RECORD MINERAL DEEDS FOR PROLONGED 
PERIODS OF TIME?
A. In some cases the Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted 
the position that because of the fluctuating and 
uncertain values of oil and gas lands, parties 
asserting title thereto must act more promptly than in
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ordinary cases. Pope v. Pennzoil Producing Company.
288 Ark. 10 (1986); Jackson v. Braden, 290 Ark. 117 
(1986).
B. Should persons be required to record mineral deeds
within a reasonable period of time in order to promote 
certainty of title?
VI. OTHER RECENT CASES OF INTEREST:
A. Wallace v. Missouri Improvement Company, 294 Ark. 99, 
740 S.W.2d 920 (1987). The tract of land involved was 
condemned by the United States in 1942 for use as a 
military base known as Fort Chaffee. Under the 
Declaration of Taking the United States condemned the 
fee simple title and deposited the estimated just 
compensation. At the time the minerals were owned by 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, the predecessor in 
title to Missouri Improvement Company. The Railroad 
was never made a party defendant nor notified of the 
condemnation proceedings. In 1948 the United States 
quitclaimed its interest in the tract to Wallace's 
predecessor in title. Wallace claimed ownership of the 
minerals because the United States had acquired the 
full fee simple title in the condemnation action. The 
trial court held the minerals were owned by Missouri 
Improvement Company, and upon appeal this decision was 
affirmed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the basic 
constitutional requirements of notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard were not met, and therefore the 
United States did not acquire the minerals owned by the 
Railroad. The Court relied on the fact that at the 
time of the condemnation the minerals were assessed in 
the same tax book (not sub-joined), and that a 
reasonable search would have revealed the mineral 
ownership of the Railroad.
This decision is directly contrary to the decision in 
the case of United States of America v. Herring. 750 
F.2d 669 (1984).
B. Haynes V. Metcalf, 297 Ark. 40, 759 S.W.2d 542 (1988). 
The fee title to the tract of land involved was vested 
in V. F. Metcalf alone and in 1969 him and his wife,
Oma Metcalf, the appellee, executed a deed to Verna 
Haynes, the appellant, which contained a reservation by 
the grantors of the royalties and mineral rights so 
long as either of the grantors lived. V. F. Metcalf
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died in 1984 and this litigation involved who should 
receive the royalties from producing wells.
The Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the general 
rule that an exception or reservation in favor of a 
stranger to a deed is void except to confirm a right 
which the stranger already had. Cases from other 
jurisdictions were cited which held that there is an 
exception to this rule when there is a reservation of a 
life estate in favor of the spouse of the grantor. 
However, the Court stated it was not necessary to 
decide whether Arkansas would follow this exception. 
Instead, the Court held that Haynes was in possession 
of the deed from 1969 until 1986, when this lawsuit was 
commenced, and made no objection to the reservation, 
and she was therefore estopped from changing the terms 
thereof.
VII. RECENT DECISIONS CONSTRUING WHETHER DEEDS TO RAILROADS
CONVEYED THE FEE TITLE OR ONLY A RIGHT OF WAY:
A. Coleman v . Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 294 Ark. 
633, 745 S.W.2d 622 (1988). Three deeds were involved. 
One conveyed "a strip of land one hundred feet wide."
Another conveyed "a strip of land 100 feet wide for 
right of way also an additional strip of land 250 feet 
wide extending lying on the south side of said right of 
way and adjacent thereto . . . .” The third deed 
conveyed "a strip of land 100 feet wide for right of 
way . . . also extra for depot grounds a strip of land 
250 feet wide lying south of and adjoining said right 
of way.”
The trial court held these deeds conveyed the fee 
simple title, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
B. Wylie v. Tull, 298 Ark. 511, 769 S.W.2d 409 (1989). 
Approximately 50 deeds were involved. A few were 
headed "Warranty Deed" but conveyed either a strip 100 
feet wide or a strip 200 feet wide "for right of way." 
The rest were titled "Right of Way Deed" and conveyed a 
strip 100 feet wide with the right of borrow earth of 
said "right of way." Dower was relinquished in most.
The trial court held these deeds conveyed only rights 
of way, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
C. Brewer & Taylor Company v. Wall, 299 Ark. 18, 769 
S.W.2d 753 (1989). Seven deeds were involved. All 
were headed "Right of Way and Release of Damages" and 
stated "hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the 
Choctaw & Memphis Railroad Company, and unto its 
successors and assigns forever, a strip of land one
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hundred feet in width for a right of way." Dower was 
relinquished in all but one of the deeds.
The trial court held these deeds conveyed only rights 
of way, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
D. These cases follow the general rule that when
construing deeds the primary concern is to ascertain 
the intention of the parties, and that the deeds will 
be examined from their four corners for the purpose of 
ascertaining that intent from the language employed.
In this connection the Brewer & Taylor Company v. Wall 
case stated that the following factors are indications 
of the intent to convey an easement or right of way:
1. The deed specifies that the land conveyed is for a 
right of way.
2. Only nominal consideration is stated.
3. The shape of the tract makes other uses unlikely.
4. The railroad is given the specific right to take 
stone, gravel, timber and earth from the strip 
itself.
The Brewer & Taylor Company v. Wall case stated that 
the following factors are indications of the intent to 
convey a fee simple interest:
1. The right of increasing the width of the strip of 
land for necessary slopes, embankments, turnouts 
and with the right of changing water courses, and 
of taking a supply of water and of borrowing or 
wasting earth, stone or gravel outside the strip.
2. The conveyance of additional land besides the 
strip.
3. The relinquishment of dower rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION:
A. The Supreme Court, although giving lip service to the 
desirability of certainty in titles, has failed to 
apply same in some of its decisions.
B. It seems the Court decides some cases based upon its 
view of equity in the particular situation without
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regard to the precedent, or lack of precedent, being 
set.
C. The name of the game seems to be hooray for the person 
who does not record his mineral deed for many, many 
years, and to hell with persons who have in good faith 
relied upon no such deed being of record during those 
many years.
D. It is difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy 
what the courts are liable to do in situations where 
the facts vary at all from those of previous decisions. 
Therefore, the only logical solution is to take 
protective leases.
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